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Foreign banks have increased their market share in many emerging markets since the mid-
1990s. We examine whether this contributed to financial stability in the respective host coun-
tries in the global financial crisis. Our results suggest that the stabilizing impact of foreign 
banks was limited to the cross-border component of financial globalization and to two re-
gions: Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Only in the latter region was this translated 
into more stable credit growth. Thus hopes that a stronger presence of foreign banks might 
help host countries in isolating domestic credit from international shocks did not materialize 
in the current crisis. 
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1  Introduction  
This paper examines whether foreign banks contributed to financial stability in emerging market 
economies (EMEs) and developing countries (DCs) in the global financial crisis by mitigating 
the sudden stop of capital flows and the contraction of credit growth after the Lehman collapse. 
It is motivated by the fact that after the EME crises of the 1990s the entry of foreign banks was 
seen as a key measure to strengthen the resilience of EME and DC banking sectors against ex-
ternal shocks. Authorities in many EMEs and DCs followed this policy recommendation. As a 
result, the average share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks in EMEs and DCs rose 
from 21 percent in 1995 to 38 percent in 2005. 
In this environment of globalised banking, cross-border capital flows from mature economies to 
EMEs and DCs recovered from the crises-lows of the late 1990s. Aggregate outstanding claims 
of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis EMEs and DCs almost tripled between 2000 and the third quar-
ter of 2008. Moreover – as in previous episodes of strong capital inflows – growth of real pri-
vate sector credit was advancing rapidly. The trend of increasing financial integration and deep-
ening ended abruptly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Cross-border 
bank flows stopped or even reversed and real credit growth slowed substantially in most coun-
tries. However, the degree of the downturn varied across countries and regions. While some 
countries experienced a classical sudden stop of capital flows and a strong credit contraction, the 
decline was more subdued in other countries.  
We analyze the role of foreign banks in stabilizing cross-border bank flows and credit growth in 
EMEs and DCs after the Lehman collapse, controlling for the size of the pre-crisis boom and 
other determinants of financial instability. Based on a sample of 97 EMEs and DCs and estimat-
ing a cross-sectional OLS model we find that their stabilizing impact was limited to the cross-
border component of financial globalization. EME and DC banking sectors with a higher share 
of foreign ownership in total banking assets experienced a smaller decline in capital flows. One 
percentage point more of foreign bank asset share leads to a decrease of more than two percent 
in the magnitude of fall of cross-border bank flows. However, foreign banks did not signifi-
cantly dampen the decline in credit growth in their respective host countries. These results are 
robust to variations of the instability and boom measures. 
A closer analysis shows that the stabilizing impact of foreign banks was a regional rather than a 
global phenomenon.  Foreign banks mitigated the fall in cross-border bank flows to Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, only in Sub-Saharan Africa did 
foreign banks contribute to a more stable growth of credit in the crisis period. We interpret our 
results as indicating that foreign banks are no panacea for guaranteeing financial stability in 
EMEs and DCs in an environment of increasing financial globalization. In particular, hopes that 
a stronger presence of foreign banks might help host countries in isolating domestic credit from 
international shocks did not materialize in the current crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows: after a short review of the literature and the empirical evi-
dence on foreign banks and financial stability issues in EMEs and DCs (section 2), we illustrate 
developments in cross-border bank flows and real domestic credit growth during the financial   Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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crisis (section 3). Section 4 describes our data and the model specification. Sections 5 and 6 pre-
sent the results and robustness checks and section 7 concludes. 
 
2  Foreign Banks and Financial Stability: Literature Review and Empirical 
Evidence 
Boom-bust cycles in capital flows and domestic credit characterized financial liberalization in 
emerging markets and developing countries in the 1990s, (Tornell and Westermann 2002, Men-
doza and Terrones 2008). From a financial stability perspective, the evidence suggests two pos-
sible policy responses. The first response is to pursue a cautious approach toward capital ac-
count liberalization (Rodrik and Subramanian 2009, Ostry et al. 2010). Capital controls and 
regulatory measures limit capital inflows, in particular highly reversible flows, like cross-border 
bank lending (Becker et al. 2007). Thus, domestic credit growth and the associated financial 
stability risks remain contained. The second response is to strengthen domestic banking sectors 
in EMEs and DCs, as buoyant capital flows bring about unsustainable credit booms in an envi-
ronment characterized by poor governance of domestic banks and a weak supervisory and regu-
latory framework (Krugman 1998, Llewellyn 2002, Hernández and Landerretche 2002). Thus, 
EMEs and DCs should not retreat on financial opening but improve the domestic financial sys-
tems. Inviting foreign banks to enter domestic banking sectors is a major element of a strategy to 
achieve this goal (Mishkin 2001).  
Foreign institutions are expected to strengthen financial stability in EMEs and DCs by improv-
ing the solvency and liquidity of host country banking systems. Banking sector solvency im-
proves because foreign banks are better capitalized than their domestic peers. Moreover, they 
provide ‘reputational capital’ (Hellman and Murdock 1998) due to their long presence in the 
financial markets of mature economies. Finally, foreign banks have superior credit technologies, 
better management expertise and governance structures and are less open to government and 
political interference than domestic banks (Detragiache et al. 2008). Banking sector liquidity is 
enhanced because depositors’ trust in the stability of foreign institutions makes local bank runs 
less likely. Moreover foreign banks mitigate the risk of sudden stops and capital flow reversals 
as parent banks will provide the needed international liquidity in crisis periods to safeguard their 
investments in the respective host countries (Moreno and Villar 2005).  
The empirical evidence on foreign banks and financial stability in EMEs and DCs is mixed. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) find that foreign bank presence is negatively associated with the 
incidence of banking sector fragility. Moreover, the results of most studies indicate that foreign 
banks smooth domestic credit in periods of financial distress. However, there are substantial 
regional differences. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006, 2010) find that foreign banks in Eastern 
Europe had less of a need to rein their credit supply during a financial crisis. By contrast, the 
stabilizing impact has been more subdued and diverse in Latin America and Asia (Arena et al. 
2007). Moreover, the stabilizing impact on credit growth depends on the relative strength and 
soundness of the respective parent banks (De Haas and van Lelyveld 2006, 2010; Aydin 2008). 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 149 
 
foreign banks might be more about the relative strengths of institutions rather than ownership 
per se.  
After the financial crises of the 1990s many EMEs and DCs followed the recommendation to 
enhance financial stability by strengthening domestic financial sectors rather than by backtrack-
ing on financial integration. This included (the) opening up to foreign institutions, in particular 
in Latin America (LAC) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS) 2004, Cull and Martinez Peria 2007). Both regions were the main 
drivers accounting for the rise in the average share of assets held by foreign banks in total bank-
ing sector assets of EMEs and DCs (Appendix 1). By contrast, the strong presence of foreign 
banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) does not reflect an overall policy approach toward financial 
liberalization, but the legacy of the colonial past (Daumont et al. 2004) and – compared to other 
regions – a substantially higher share of foreign banks from other EMEs and DCs (Van Horen 
2007). Indeed, SSA countries – on average – take a rather restrictive stance on financial integra-
tion. The same applies to Emerging Asia and most countries in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MENA). In the latter regions, the generally sceptical attitude toward financial liberaliza-
tion influenced policies on the entry of foreign banks, as many countries did not open up their 
banking systems to foreign institutions. As a result, there is no country with a high penetration 
of foreign banks in these regions (Figure 1). 








The line in the box indicates the median, the bottom and the top of 
the box are the 25th and the 75th percentiles and the ends of the 
whiskers mark the 5th and 95th percentiles. Dots represent outliers.  
Source: Claessens et al. 2008, own calculations 
 
The years before 2008 were characterized by a substantial decline in the number and severity of 
EME and DC banking crises compared to the 1990s (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Against this 
background, the global financial crisis provides the first significant test for the arguments in 
favour of a stabilizing role of foreign banks in EMEs and DCs after the substantial increase in 
foreign ownership. First results suggest that the positive effects on host banking sector solvency 
may have been overestimated. Focusing on Eastern Europe, Mihaljek (2008) argues that risk 
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context. Parent banks have relied on overly optimistic reports from local managers in host coun-
tries about the extent of the credit risk they have taken on board when providing loans to busi-
nesses  and  households.  With  regard  to  liquidity,  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  radically 
changed the environment for any possible liquidity support by parent banks to their EME and 
DC subsidiaries and branches. Facing the collapse of national and global interbank markets par-
ent banks themselves scrambled for liquidity and had to rely on support from the respective 
lenders of last resort (Winkler 2009). Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) provide evidence suggest-
ing that the transmission of the liquidity shock after Lehman to emerging markets was severe for 
EMEs with a strong presence of foreign banks that were subsidiaries of parent banks with a US 
Dollar liquidity shortage in September 2008. However, they also find that domestic banks in 
EMEs and DCs relying on cross-border flows from the same mature economies reacted in a 
similar way, suggesting that foreign ownership as such did not aggravate the credit contraction 
in host countries. Finally, EMEs and DCs with the highest reliance on cross-border flows did 
not seem to suffer the greatest declines in domestic lending, rejecting the hypothesis of a joint 
boom-bust cycle of cross-border flows and domestic lending in the recent turmoil. This is in line 
with evidence provided by EBRD (2009) and Aisen and Franken (2010). Parent banks supplied 
their subsidiaries in Eastern Europe with international liquidity (EBRD 2009), thereby mitigat-
ing the sudden stop in capital flows after Lehman. However, based on a larger sample of coun-
tries, also including mature economies, Aisen and Franken (2010) do not find evidence for the 
proposition that foreign banks contributed positively to a stable flow of credit in EMEs and DCs 
in the post-crisis period.  
We contribute to this literature by directly testing the validity of the policy proposition that a 
higher share of foreign ownership of EME and DC banking sector assets stabilizes cross-border 
capital flows and domestic credit in times of financial distress. As the Lehman event marks a 
clear-cut beginning of the crisis, we measure instability by the magnitude of the post-Lehman 
declines in cross-border bank flows and credit growth rates against the levels and growth rates 
seen before the crisis. This is because it is not the post-crisis level of flows or lending per se 
which constitutes a sudden stop or credit contraction forcing the real economy to adjust, but the 
change in flows and credit growth. A decline in cross-border bank flows from pre-crisis heights 
to a much lower but still positive level can be a severe financial shock for a country. Moreover, 
given the substantial regional differences in foreign ownership among EMEs and DCs we con-
duct a regional analysis in order to find out whether the contribution of foreign banks to finan-
cial stability has been different across regions.  
 
3  Cross-Border Bank Flows and Real Credit Growth in the Crisis – an Il-
lustration  
Cross-border bank flows from mature economies to EMEs and DCs rose from a level around 
zero in 2000 to over USD 130 bn in the second quarter of 2007 (Figure 2).
1 After the collapse of 
Lehman, EMEs and DCs faced a classical sudden stop in capital flows which is defined as large 
and unexpected falls in capital inflows (e.g. Calvo et al. 2004). The fourth quarter of 2008 even 
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   quarterly bank flows (lhs)    outstanding claims (rhs)
Source: BIS International locational banking statistics, own calculations
saw an outflow of funds in the amount of USD 190 billion. As a result the outstanding volume 
of claims by BIS reporting banks to EMEs and DCs declined from over USD 2.000 billion in the 
middle of 2008 to less than USD 1.700 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2009.  












Closer analysis reveals that there were substantial regional differences in the boom and bust 
periods (Figure 3). In the period preceding the Lehman collapse capital inflows were most pro-
nounced in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, followed by Asia and Latin America. The reversal 
was most immediate in Asia and Latin America, as both regions recorded outflows in the third 
quarter of 2008. By contrast, capital inflows to Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa merely 
slowed down, but were still positive. The fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 
saw outflows in all regions – except in MENA in the first quarter of 2009.  
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ASIA (13) ECA (23) LAC (21) MENA (9) SSA (31)
no. of countries in parentheses
Source: BIS International locational banking statistics, own calculations
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  m-o-m real credit growth   moving average (12 month)
Source: IFS, national sources, own calculations









A country-by-country analysis reveals that two-thirds out of 97 EMEs and DCs experienced 
capital inflows before 2008Q3 and capital outflows in the post-Lehman quarters. Moreover 49 
of our sample countries experienced quarterly inflows higher than two standard deviations from 
the pre-crisis mean (2000 – 2008Q2) during the four quarters before the Lehman collapse and 37 
less than two standard deviations below the mean in the three post-shock quarters.  
Growth of real private sector credit in EMEs and DC had been on a rising trend since 2000 
(Figure 4). From mid-2007 on credit growth started to decline. 










Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 











Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2006 2007 2008 2009
ASIA (13) ECA (18) LAC (20) MENA (9) SSA (27)
no. of countries in parentheses
Source: IFS, national sources, own calculations
(ASIA: emerging Asia, ECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin American Countries, MENA: Middle East and Northern Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa)
However, there were again substantial cross-regional differences (Figure 5). In Eastern Europe 
credit growth slowed at the end of 2007/early 2008 but remained on elevated levels, while aver-
age credit growth in LAC turned negative in 2009Q1 and remained relatively stable in Asia. By 
contrast, credit growth slowed down markedly and turned negative in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America after the Lehman shock, while credit growth proved largely resilient in Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. 









4  Data and Model Specification 
We analyze whether foreign bank presence had a stabilizing impact on cross-border bank flows 
and real credit growth in the recent crisis. Cross-border bank flows are from the BIS Interna-
tional Locational Banking statistics and are the exchange-rate-adjusted changes from the quar-
terly reports of outstanding claims of all BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis non-residents and vis-à-
vis residents in foreign currency. Currently banking institutions in 42 countries are reporting to 
the BIS Locational statistics. As these countries include all major economies and the largest cen-
ters of  financial  activity the coverage of international banking  activity is virtually  complete 
(Wooldridge 2002).  
We obtain data on domestic private sector credit from the IMFs International Financial Statistics 
(IFS line 22d). We deflate it using the CPI series (IFS line 64). As data availability is limited we 
supplement the IFS CPI data with data from national sources for China, Ukraine, Hungary and 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina
2.  We  seasonally  adjust  these  series  and  calculate  month-on-month 
                                                 
2  National Bureau of Statistics of China, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Hungarian Central Statistical Of-
fice and Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.   Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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growth rates for real private sector credit growth. We use growth rates for real credit as there is 
no data for exchange rate adjusted changes in the outstanding stock of domestic credit as is the 
case for cross-border bank flows provided by the BIS. We have collected data for 97 EMEs and 
DCs. Due to the limited availability of data for some indicators the number of observations in 
our estimations is often smaller.  
We construct variables to measure the magnitude of instability in bank flows and credit growth 
during the crisis. These variables we call FALL as they depict the sudden drop from the (in most 
cases) higher pre-Lehman level to the post-Lehman level. 
-  FALLflows is the log of the difference between the average cross-border bank flows to 
country i in the four quarters preceding the Lehman collapse (2007Q3 - 2008Q2) and 
the  average  cross-border  bank  flows  in  the  two  post-shock  quarters  (2008Q4  to 
2009Q1) in US dollar. We disregard the crisis quarter itself, as the respective data re-
flects developments before and after the shock. As FALLflows has a negative value in 
17 countries we follow Papaioannou (2009) and Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) by 
taking the logarithm of the absolute value and assign it a negative sign.  
-  FALLcredit is the difference between the average monthly growth rate of real private 
sector credit in country i in the year preceding the Lehman bankruptcy, i.e. September 
2007 - August 2008, and the average monthly growth rate of real private sector credit 
in the six months following the Lehman shock, i.e. October 2008 - March 2009. For 
symmetry we again drop the crisis quarter. Further we multiply the measure with one 
hundred to increase the coefficient estimates. 
A higher FALL value indicates greater financial instability in the respective country.  
The explanatory variable of our main interest is the asset share of foreign banks in total banking 
sector assets in the respective host countries (FBAS). We use the dataset by Claessens et al 
(2008), where foreign banks are defined as banks with direct foreign ownership of more than 50 
percent of capital. We expect foreign bank presence to have a mitigating impact on our FALL 
variables (i.e. negative coefficients).  
The boom-bust literature suggests that the pre-crisis boom is a major determinant of the fall. For 
example Sula (2006) shows that surges in capital inflows significantly increases the probability 
of sudden stops. Thus, we construct measures for the SURGE in cross-border bank flows and 
real credit growth prior to the shock as additional explanatory variables: 
-  SURGEflows is the log of the aggregated quarterly cross-border bank flows over the 
three years prior to the Lehman bankruptcy (i.e. 2005Q3-2008Q2).  
-  SURGEcredit is the average month-on-month real credit growth rate in the three years 
prior to the crisis (July 2005-June 2008). To increase the coefficient estimates we 
again multiply by 100. 
We expect the SURGEs to aggravate the FALLs, i.e. positive coefficient estimates. For testing 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 149 
 
We estimate the following cross-sectional OLS model applying heteroscedasticity robust stan-
dard errors and using Stata: 
i ik k i i i X SURGE FBAS FALL ε γ β α + + + = * * *  
Note that FALL and SURGE are both, either the fall and surge in bank flows or the fall and 
surge in real credit growth in country i. FBAS is the foreign bank asset share in total banking 
assets in country i. X is a matrix of the following structural and macroeconomic variables as well 
as external and internal vulnerability indicators: 
Structural and macroeconomic variables: 
-  Institutional quality (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Better creditor protection and informa-
tion sharing among institutions like public credit registries provide comfort to foreign 
and domestic investors (Papaioannou 2009). Thus, we expect a higher level of institu-
tional quality to mitigate the magnitude of our FALL measures. Following Kose et al. 
(2009) we use the simple 2008 average of the six individual World Governance Indi-
cators as well the change from 2007 to 2008 as proxies for institutional quality. 
-  De jure financial openness (Chinn and Ito 2008). An open capital account facilitates 
capital inflows and credit growth spurred by foreign borrowing. Thus, countries with a 
higher index value should be more vulnerable to external shocks. Accordingly, we ex-
pect a positive coefficient.  
-  Export partners’ GDP growth in 2009 (IMF DOTS). Real GDP growth of the 30 
main  export  partners  in  2009  weighted  by  their  share  in  total  exports  of  a  given 
EME/DC in 2008. Following Aisen and Franken (2010) we construct this variable to 
account for economic activity after the crisis avoiding endogeneity problems. We ex-
pect a negative coefficient as higher GDP growth in the main trading partners indi-
cates higher demand for that country’s exports and hence stronger domestic economic 
activity. This should positively influence bank flows and credit growth.  
-  Current account to GDP in 2007 (IMF WEO). The current account balance provides 
information about countries’ positions as net providers or recipients of external fi-
nance. Countries with a positive (less negative balance) are less prone to capital flow 
reversals as they do not depend on external finance in net terms. Thus, a higher cur-
rent account surplus should be associated with a smaller FALL, i.e. we expect a nega-
tive coefficient.  
-  Percentage change in money market rate (IFS line 60b) Growth in real private sec-
tor credit is influenced by domestic monetary policy reflected in interest rates prevail-
ing on money markets (Aisen and Franken 2010). Thus, the percentage change in the 
money market rate between Sept. 2008 and March 2009 serves as a proxy for the abil-
ity and willingness of central banks to foster credit expansion after Lehman. We ex-
pect that a larger decline in the money market rate dampens the magnitude of FALL-
credit (positive coefficient expected). We refrain from using the change in money mar-
ket rate as an independent variable in the estimation of FALLflows as - with open capital   Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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accounts - it is a variable influenced by changes in cross-border flows and the ex-
change rate regime. 
External and internal vulnerabilities: 
-  External debt to GNI (WDI). Net debtor countries face a higher risk of sudden stops 
and thus a decline in capital flows and domestic credit as the indebtedness of a coun-
try depicts vulnerability regarding the risk of default (positive coefficient expected).  
-  Exchange rate regime. A floating exchange rate provides a certain buffer against ex-
ternal shocks. Thus, we expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative as - making 
use of the IMF exchange rate classification with a scale from one to eight - a higher 
value indicates a more flexible exchange rate (Appendix 3).  
-  International reserves to total external debt in 2007 (WDI). A higher ratio indi-
cates that the country is in a better position to deal with liquidity shocks, comforting 
both foreign investors as well as domestic financial institutions. Thus, a higher ratio 
should  stabilize  capital  inflows  as  well  as  credit  growth  (negative  coefficient  ex-
pected)  
-  Foreign liability dollarization (Lane and Shambaugh 2010). A higher share of exter-
nal liabilities denominated in foreign currency (‘original sin’) in total external liabili-
ties indicates a higher exposure to exchange rate risk, making countries more vulner-
able to sudden stops and the corresponding decline in credit growth (positive coeffi-
cient expected). 
-  Credit deposit ratio in 2007 (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009). Banking sectors with 
a higher credit to deposit ratio rely on other funding sources, including foreign fund-
ing, to finance credit expansion. Given this dependency on foreign funds, in a crisis 
situation, foreign investors are inclined to withdraw from these countries as early as 
possible, forcing banks to adjust private sector credit respectively, suggesting a posi-
tive coefficient. However, the opposite reasoning might apply with regard to capital 
flows  for  countries  with  a  strong  foreign  bank  presence  (Cetorelli  and  Goldberg 
2010). Parent banks might initially withdraw funds from countries with a low credit 
deposit ratio because headquarters want to make use of the excess liquidity held by 
their subsidiaries abroad. This argument suggests a negative coefficient.  
Further we use a set of dummy variables to account for effects of the different groups of coun-
tries regarding region, income and other characteristics.
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5  Results  
5.1  Basic Model 
We find the expected mitigating impact of foreign bank presence on FALL as all coefficient es-
timates of FBAS show the expected negative sign (Table 1). However, only for FALLflows, the 
fall in cross-border bank flows, is the impact of foreign banks significant (columns 1-3). Each 
additional  percentage  point  in  foreign  bank  asset  share  leads  to  a  decrease  in  FALLflows  of 
roughly two percent. Turning to FALLcredit, the fall in real credit growth, we find a mitigating but 
not significant impact of foreign bank presence (columns 4-6).  
Table 1: The basic model 
Dependent variable: respective FALL measure  
  Flows 1/  Credit 2/ 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
FBAS  -0.0255**  -0.0299***  -0.0198**  -0.0019  -0.0054  -0.0055 
  (0.0119)  (0.0096)  (0.0078)  (0.0050)  (0.0044)  (0.0045) 
SURGE 3/ 4/    0.4070***  0.1678***    0.6872***  0.7052 
    (0.0548)  (0.0555)    (0.1371)  (0.4565) 
SURGE^2      0.0610***      -0.0050 
      (0.0085)      (0.1206) 
constant  5.6461***  3.7180***  1.2198**  0.5753**  -0.2296  -0.2392 
  (0.5808)  (0.5313)  (0.5536)  (0.2520)  (0.2720)  (0.3594) 
R-sqr  0.046  0.399  0.612  0.002  0.252  0.252 
N  97  97  97  78  78  78 
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 1 percent level.  
Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors applied. 
1/ FALL for flows is the logarithm of the difference between average pre-shock inflows in 2007Q3-2008Q2 and average post-shock inflows in 
2008Q4-2009Q1. 
2/ FALL for credit is the difference between the average m-o-m real credit growth in the pre-crisis period July 2007-June 2008 and the post-
shock period October 2008-March 2009, seasonally adjusted rates.  
3/ SURGE for flows is the (log of the) aggregated capital inflows in the three years preceding the Lehman bankruptcy (2005Q3-2008Q2). 
4/ SURGE for credit is the average m-o-m real credit growth rate in the three years prior to the crisis (i.e. July 2005-June 2008), seasonally 
adjusted rates. 
 
Further we find strong evidence for the expected boom-bust relationship for bank flows and 
credit growth. SURGEflows has a significant positive non-linear impact on FALLflows (column 3). 
The more it varies upward or downward from the turning point (i.e. 1.4) the more aggravating is 
its marginal impact on FALLflows. A closer look at the countries experiencing lower aggregate 
inflows or even outflows suggests that this might be due to other destabilizing factors like insti-
tutional underdevelopment and political risk. Those factors might have become more important 
in an environment of increasing global financial stress and risk aversion. Overall, the higher the 
absolute SURGE in flows prior to the crisis (no matter if inflows or outflows) the more destabi-
lizing was its impact after the financial shock.  
The pre-crisis credit boom is an important determinant of the magnitude of the credit contrac-
tion. We find a positive and significant linear relationship (column 5). The higher the pre-shock 
credit boom, the higher the FALL after the Lehman collapse.  
The basic models containing foreign bank presence and the booms prior to the Lehman shock as 
explanatory variables explain about 60 percent of the variation in FALLflows and 25 percent of the 
variation in FALLcredit.   Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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Capital inflows and credit growth are closely linked. General economic developments or situa-
tions in a country might simultaneously  affect the shock in bank inflows and in real credit 
growth. Therefore it might be that the equation errors correlate. To control for this we further 
test the relationship with a seemingly unrelated regression system proposed by Zellner in 1962 
(Table 2). 
Table 2: Seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SUR) 
Equation  Obs  Parms  RMSE  R-sqr  Chi2  P 
FALLflows  78  3  2.309576  0.5909  114.83  0.0000 
FALLcredit  78  2  1.144419  0.2524  26.73  0.0000 
             
   Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
FALLflows             
  FBAS   -.01626  .0087343  -1.86  0.063  -.0333789  .0008589 
  SURGE  .1371797  .067449  2.03  0.042  .0049822  .2693773 
  SURGE^2  .0646446  .0093888  6.89  0.000  .046243  .0830463 
  constant  1.040308  .6360204  1.64  0.102  -.2062691  2.286885 
FALLcredit                   
  FBAS   -.0054514  .0043591  -1.25  0.211  -.0139951  .0030923 
  SURGE  .6895482  .1338541  5.15  0.000  .427199  .9518973 
  constant  -.2323562  .2663358  -0.87  0.383  -.7543648  .2896524 
 
The SUR-estimation results confirm our previous ones. While a higher foreign bank presence 
stabilizes bank inflows during the crisis this is not translated into more stable real credit growth. 
Further the pre-crisis surges remain important determinants in both equations. 
Instability in bank flows and credit growth might be influenced by many variables. To test 
whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the regression we add the 
variables referred to in section 4. Due to data availability (Appendix 4) and correlation among 
independent variables (Appendix 5) we first determine financial openness and economic activity 
growth as main further determinants on the FALLs. Then we add each of the other one by one 
before mentioned variables to control for their effects.  
We find that financial openness and the change in institutional quality significantly affect the 
instability in bank flows (Appendix 6). As expected higher financial openness and a recent dete-
rioration in institutional quality aggravate the FALL. We explain the significant effect of recent 
changes in institutional quality with the increasing risk awareness after the Lehman collapse. 
The coefficient estimate of the reserves to debt ratio is significant as well (column 7), indicating 
that better reserve adequacy stabilized bank flows. However, a closer look at the data reveals 
that this result is driven by some outlier values. Botswana, China, Nigeria and Algeria have re-
serve to debt ratios higher than 400 (while the median of all countries is 53, the mean 123). If 
we exclude them from the sample the coefficient estimate loses significance.  
For FALLcredit only foreign liability dollarization has a significant and positive effect, indicating 
that a higher liability dollarization aggravates the instability of credit growth (Appendix 7). 
Moreover, only when adding FLD to the basic model does the coefficient estimate of FBAS be-
come significant, indicating a mitigating impact of foreign bank presence (column 9). This sug-
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nal sin’ problem and face a currency mismatch. In all other estimations the coefficient estimate 
of FBAS remains negative and insignificant.  
5.2  Regional Differentiation  
The illustration of bank flows and credit growth before and during the financial crisis revealed 
substantial regional differences (Section 3). The same applies to the presence of foreign banks in 
the respective EME and DC regions which is heterogeneous regarding dispersion and penetra-
tion of foreign bank presence per region (Figure 1). These regional differences might affect the 
mitigating impact of foreign banks on the stability of bank flows and credit growth. We test for 
regional differences by interacting region-dummies with our variable for foreign bank presence. 
The results indicate that the effect of foreign bank presence on FALL in bank flows and real 
credit growth differs considerably among regions.  
Regarding the FALL in bank flows we find only in ECA and SSA a negative and significant 
marginal effect of foreign bank presence (Table 3). Within the other regions foreign bank pres-
ence even had a slightly destabilizing albeit not significant impact.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa the stabilizing impact of foreign banks on bank flows was translated into 
more stable credit growth during the financial crisis. However in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, banking sectors do not seem to transmit their relatively stable external funding position to 
a smooth pattern of domestic real credit growth. With exception of SSA, foreign banks do not 
have a significant impact on stability in credit growth.  
The stabilizing impact of foreign banks is highest in those regions with the highest average for-
eign bank presence. Moreover, the impact of foreign banks on domestic credit growth might 
only emerge when foreign banks are dominating players in host country banking systems. This 
might suggest that the influence of foreign banks is due to a certain level of foreign bank pres-
ence rather than to other, region-specific factors of influence. We test this proposition by group-
ing our sample countries according to their foreign bank asset share. Countries with up to 33 
percent foreign bank asset share belong to group T1, those in T2 have more than 33 and up to 66 
percent foreign bank asset share, while countries with more than 66 percent foreign bank asset 
share belong to T3. Each group dummy we interact with FBAS. The results show insignificant 
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Table 3: Differences across regions 
Dependent variable: respective FALL measure 
  Flows 1/  Credit 2/ 
SURGE 3/ 4/  0.1327  0.8223*** 
  (0.1072)  (0.1849)    
SURGE^2  0.0613***                  
  (0.0114)                  
ASIA  0.8206  -3.1299*** 
  (1.4784)  (0.8638)    
ECA  0.4927  -3.9392**  
  (1.0166)  (1.7789)    
LAC  0.6662  -2.7359*** 
  (0.7636)  (0.9063)    
MENA  -0.1713  -3.1594*** 
  (1.2129)  (0.9362)    
SSA  1.9421***  -0.6023    
  (0.6077)  (0.9099)    
FBAS*ASIA  0.0349  0.0215    
  (0.0436)  (0.0253)    
FBAS*ECA  -0.0312**  -0.0010    
  (0.0146)  (0.0126)    
FBAS*LAC  0.0111  -0.0049    
  (0.0117)  (0.0056)    
FBAS*MENA  0.0447  0.0323    
  (0.0524)  (0.0268)    
FBAS*SSA  -0.0361***  -0.0391*** 
  (0.0127)  (0.0133)    
FIN.OPENNESS  0.3439*  0.1374    
  (0.1988)  (0.1003)    
ExpP GDP GROWTH  -0.2069  -0.2368**  
  (0.1260)  (0.1158)    
INST.QUALITY change  -5.5661*                  
  (2.8561)                  
FLD    0.0324*** 
    (0.0105)    
R-sqr  0.885  0.582    
N  91  63    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent 
and *** 1 percent level. 
Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors 
applied. 
1/ FALL for flows is the logarithm of the difference between 
average pre-shock inflows in 2007Q3-2008Q2 and average 
post-shock inflows in 2008Q4-2009Q1. 
2/ FALL for credit is the difference between the average m-o-m 
real credit growth in the pre-crisis period July 2007-June 2008 
and the post-shock period October 2008-March 2009. 
3/ SURGE for flows is the (log of the) aggregated capital inflows 
in the three years preceding the Lehman bankruptcy (2005Q3-
2008Q2). 
4/ SURGE for credit is the average m-o-m real credit growth 
rate in the three years prior to the crisis (i.e. July 2005-June 
2008). 
 
As the number of countries per group is diverse we further test for a conditional impact of for-
eign bank presence with only two groups and, moreover, with a squared FBAS variable instead 
of grouping. Coefficient estimates of the interaction and of the squared term do not show sig-
nificance as well.  
Overall our results indicate that the mitigating impact of foreign bank presence is a regional 
rather than a global phenomenon. Our conjecture is that it is either the regional characteristics of 
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bilized bank funding during the crisis period. ECA includes all countries of Eastern Europe that 
have either become New Member States of the European Union or are deemed to become Mem-
ber States in the future. Thus, activities of foreign banks as well as cross-border capital flows 
have at least partly been driven by the European integration process (Berglöf and Bolton 2002). 
Parent banks from the EU-15 have established subsidiaries in the respective host countries as 
they regard them as an extension of their home markets (Winkler 2009). This peculiarity of 
European integration in the ongoing process of financial globalization was already noted before 
the global financial crisis as it was accompanied by a strong divergence of current account pat-
terns  in  the  region  compared  to  other  emerging  markets  (Abiad,  Leigh  and  Mody  2007, 
Herrmann and Winkler 2009). Our results suggest that it has also had an impact on the stability 
of cross-border bank flows in the crisis period as parent banks seem to have provided liquidity 
support to their subsidiaries in an effort to safeguard their long-term investments in an enlarged 
home market. Their supporting role was facilitated by the backing of mature economy central 
banks, governments as well as international financial institutions (EBRD 2009). 
Table 4: Grouping of countries by foreign bank presence 
Dependent variable: respective FALL measure 
  Flows 1/  Credit 2/ 
SURGE 3/ 4/  0.1232  0.6411**  
  (0.1081)  (0.2776)    
SURGE^2  0.0639***                  
  (0.0117)                  
T1 /5  0.9982  -1.6570**  
  (0.6311)  (0.7934)    
T2  0.5071  -2.1161**  
  (0.9270)  (0.8844)    
T3  0.3030  -2.4837*** 
  (0.8058)  (0.7693)    
FBAS*T1  -0.0122  -0.0311    
  (0.0300)  (0.0476)    
FBAS*T2  0.0092  -0.0050    
  (0.0230)  (0.0135)    
FBAS*T3  -0.0192  -0.0101    
  (0.0164)  (0.0069)    
FIN.OPENNESS  0.3333*  0.1069    
  (0.1722)  (0.1052)    
ExpP GDP GROWTH  -0.0036  -0.0901    
  (0.0928)  (0.0695)    
INST.QUALITY change  -7.1828**                  
  (2.9042)                  
FLD    0.0267**  
    (0.0103)    
R-sqr  0.870  0.453    
N  91  63    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 
1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard 
errors applied. 
1/ FALL for flows is the logarithm of the difference between average 
pre-shock inflows in 2007Q3-2008Q2 and average post-shock inflows in 
2008Q4-2009Q1. 
2/ FALL for credit is the difference between the average m-o-m real 
credit growth in the pre-crisis period July 2007-June 2008 and the post-
shock period October 2008-March 2009. 
3/ SURGE for flows is the (log of the) aggregated capital inflows in the 
three years preceding the Lehman bankruptcy (2005Q3-2008Q2). 
4/ SURGE for credit is the average m-o-m real credit growth rate in the 
three years prior to the crisis (i.e. July 2005-June 2008). 
5/ Countries are grouped according to their foreign bank asset share: 
T1<=33%, 33%<T2<=66%, 66%<T3<=100%. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa possesses the characteristic that foreign bank presence has a long history 
which is not linked to the process of financial globalization. Indeed, on average, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the region with the closest capital account according to the Chinn-Ito Index (Appendix 
4). Thus, foreign banks significantly stabilized cross-border capital flows in a region where capi-
tal flows are restricted the most. Hence, for the global financial crisis it is difficult to base an 
argument that foreign banks enhance stability in financially open EMEs and DCs by referring to 
the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
6  Robustness Checks 
To check for the robustness of our results we conduct some sensitivity tests. We vary those two 
of our variables that are not predetermined, i.e. FALL and SURGE. The tests reveal that the 
specification of FALL is of more relevance for the robustness of our results than the specifica-
tion of the SURGE variable. Generally our findings are robust as the coefficients remain signifi-
cant for the different specifications.  
The global financial crisis started with the turmoil in mature economy money markets in August 
2007. Some EMEs, like Kazakhstan and Russia were already affected by this event. Thus, we 
define the pre-crisis period as 2006Q3-2007Q2, while sticking to 2008Q4-2009Q1 as the post-
crisis period after the Lehman default. We find that the stabilizing impact of foreign bank pres-
ence is insignificant for both bank flows and for credit growth (Appendix 8, columns 1 and 2). 
However, a closer look at the data reveals that this variation in the FALLflows variable particu-
larly affects countries in the MENA region. Following substantial turmoil in local stock ex-
changes in 2006, capital inflows were on a much lower level in 2007 than in 2008. As a result 
the newly defined FALL variable is smaller than the original variable for those countries. When 
we exclude the MENA countries from the estimation the FBAS coefficient turns out to be sig-
nificant again with the same strength as in our main estimation. As a second variation of our 
main FALL variable we extend the period after the Lehman shock to nine months (columns 3 
and 4), including 2009Q2 when average regional outflows were already on a declining trend or 
even turned into inflows. Further we extend the pre-crisis period to two years, i.e. 2006Q3-
2008Q2 (columns 5 and 6). The results confirm our general findings. Foreign bank presence has 
a stabilizing impact which is significant only regarding cross-border flows.  
We  change  the  SURGE  variable  by  altering  the  time  periods  covered  and  by  changing  the 
method of calculation of SURGE. We define SURGE periods for three additional time windows 
prior to the Lehman collapse. The estimations confirm our previous results (Appendix 9). The 
impact of the SURGE remains aggravating and highly significant in all estimations. As before, 
the stabilizing effect of foreign bank presence is significant regarding bank flows (columns 1-3) 
but not regarding credit growth (columns 4-6).  
Finally, we change the calculation method of SURGE. Instead of using absolute values of cross-
border flows and credit growth, we use an alternative SURGE variable that is based on devia-
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-  SURGEaltflows is the difference between the average quarterly cross-border bank flows 
in the three years prior to the Lehman bankruptcy (i.e. 2005Q3-2008Q2) and the aver-
age quarterly flows in the whole period from 2002Q1 to 2008Q2. Again we take the 
logs of these values. 
-  SURGEaltcredit is the difference between the average monthly real credit growth rate in 
the three years prior to the Lehman bankruptcy and the average m-o-m real credit 
growth rate between 2002 and mid 2008.  
In addition to the deviation of the three year pre-shock average from the pre-shock period mean 
(columns 7 and 9), we also run an estimation with the deviation of the three year pre-shock av-
erage from the whole period mean covering 2002 to mid-2009 (columns 8 and 10). Again these 
tests are in line with our previous results.  
 
7  Conclusions 
After the financial and currency crises of the 1990s many EMEs and DCs, in particular in East-
ern Europe and Latin America, opened up their banking sectors for foreign-owned banks. This 
paper analyzes the role of foreign banks for financial stability in EMEs and DCs after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers by looking at their impact on mitigating the fall in cross-border bank 
flows and domestic credit growth in the immediate post-Lehman period compared to pre-crisis 
levels.  
We find robust evidence indicating that countries with a high share of banking sector assets held 
by foreign banks experienced a more stable pattern of cross-border bank flows during the recent 
crisis  than  countries  with  a  low  share  of  banking  sector  assets  held  by  foreign  institutions. 
Moreover, the mitigating impact of foreign banks is of quantitative relevance. One percentage 
point more of foreign bank asset share leads to a decrease of more than two percent in the mag-
nitude of fall of cross-border bank flows. A regional analysis suggests that this result mainly 
reflects the impact of foreign banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This may be due to special features of both regions. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
– in particular in countries that have already joined the European Union or are deemed to be-
come Member States in the future – foreign banks have been entering host country banking 
markets because of the European integration process. Thus, parent banks perceive host markets 
as an extension of their home market and consider the presence of their subsidiaries as a long-
term investment. Moreover, parent banks received strong support from home country central 
banks and governments as well as international financial institutions in the post-crisis period. 
This may explain why in Eastern Europe cross-border flows have been less prone to a sudden 
stop than in other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa is special as many countries of the region are 
characterized by a long-standing presence of foreign banks operating in an environment of a 
rather closed capital account. Thus, foreign banks contributed to financial stability in host coun-
tries which have only marginally integrated into the global financial system. Accordingly, the 
evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa neither supports nor rejects the argument that a high degree   Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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of foreign ownership serves as a key instrument allowing EMEs and DCs to open up financially 
without running severe stability risks.  
Overall we do not find evidence indicating that foreign banks contributed to a smoother pattern 
of domestic post-crisis credit growth. The regional analysis reveals that only in Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries with a higher share of total banking sector did assets held by foreign banks ex-
perience a smaller credit contraction in the post-Lehman period.  
We interpret our results as indicating that foreign banks are no panacea for guaranteeing finan-
cial stability in EMEs and DCs in an environment of increasing financial globalization. While a 
strong foreign bank presence has mitigated the sudden stop of cross-border lending to Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, it has not contributed to a less severe domestic credit contraction. 
Moreover,  the  positive  impact  on  financial  stability  with  regard  to  cross-border  bank  flows 
seems to have more to do with the peculiar European environment than with foreign bank own-
ership as such. Thus, the evidence suggests that EMEs and DCs aiming to avoid traditional 
boom-bust cycles in domestic credit growth may be better off preventing the boom in the first 
place and/or conducting macroeconomic and regulatory policies, including regulatory policies 
with regard to the capital account, that put them in a position to act decisively when they are hit 
by an external shock (IMF 2009, Ostry et al. 2010, Goldstein and Xie 2010). However, these 
conclusions may reflect the peculiar characteristic of the crisis as a global one, triggered in ma-
ture economies with severe negative effects on the strength of the parent banks of EME and DC 
subsidiaries. The next crisis may have a different origin and history that may weigh less on the 
potential advantages of foreign banks with regard to solvency and liquidity for host country 
banking sectors. Thus, hopes that a stronger presence of foreign banks might help EMEs and 
DCs in isolating domestic credit from international shocks may materialize in a more typical 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(in percent)
ASIA (13) ECA (23) LAC (21) MENA (9) SSA (31) total average
no. of countries in parentheses
(ASIA: emerging Asia, ECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin American Countries, MENA: Middle East and Northern Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa)
Source: Claessens et al. (2008), own calculations
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Appendix 2: List of sample countries by region 
We subdivide our countries into regional groups according to the World Bank country classification 2009. We exclude high 
income countries. As Croatia, Estonia and Slovenia have been classified as high-income countries only recently, we still treat 
them as Eastern European and Central Asian countries and upper middle income countries. 
  ASIA  ECA  LAC  MENA  SSA 
1  Bangladesh   Albania   Argentina   Algeria  Angola 
2  Cambodia  Armenia   Bolivia  Egypt  Benin 
3  China  Azerbaijan   Brazil  Iran  Botswana 
4  India  Belarus   Chile  Jordan  Burkina Faso 
5  Indonesia  Bosnia & Herzegovina  Colombia  Lebanon  Burundi 
6  Malaysia  Bulgaria   Costa Rica  Libya  Cameroon 
7  Mongolia  Croatia   Cuba  Morocco  Congo DR 
8  Nepal  Estonia   Dominican Rep.  Tunisia  Côte d’Ivoire 
9  Pakistan  Georgia   Ecuador  Yemen  Ethiopia 
10  Philippines  Kazakhstan   El Salvador    Ghana 
11  Sri Lanka  Kyrgyz Republic   Guatemala    Kenya 
12  Thailand  Latvia   Haiti    Madagascar 
13  Vietnam  Lithuania   Honduras    Malawi 
14    Macedonia, FYR   Jamaica    Mali 
15    Moldova   Mexico    Mauritania 
16    Poland   Nicaragua    Mauritius 
17    Romania   Panama    Mozambique 
18    Russia   Paraguay    Namibia 
19    Serbia   Peru    Niger 
20    Slovenia   Uruguay    Nigeria 
21    Turkey   Venezuela    Rwanda 
22    Ukraine       Senegal 
23    Uzbekistan       Seychelles 
24          South Africa 
25          Sudan 
26          Swaziland 
27          Tanzania 
28          Togo 
29          Uganda 
30          Zambia 
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Appendix 3: IMF exchange rate classification scheme 
1  Exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender 
2  Currency board arrangement 
3  Conventional pegged arrangement       
3.5  Conventional peg to a composite         
4  Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands       
5  Crawling peg       
6  Crawling band       
7  Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate 
8  Independently floating       
The information is based on the de facto methodology introduced in 1997 and was retroactively updated by A. Bubula and Đ. Ötker-Robe, "The 
Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990: Evidence from De Facto Policies," WP/02/155. These data are published annually in the 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; updates are published semi-annually at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp. The official definitions of the categories are available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp. Data are accurate as of January 2008, but future retroactive reclassifications may be made. 
 
Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Region  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
FALL flows  ASIA  13  5.974  4.300  -5.857  10.791 
  ECA  23  5.555  4.108  -4.794  10.485 
  LAC  21  6.263  2.040  1.609  10.225 
  MENA  9  4.680  2.630  -1.833  6.698 
  SSA  31  2.422  3.190  -3.624  8.601 
  all  97  4.682  3.662  -5.857  10.791 
FALL credit  ASIA  10  0.251  1.273  -2.113  2.449 
  ECA  16  1.184  1.506  -2.648  3.197 
  LAC  20  0.458  0.830  -1.435  1.450 
  MENA  7  0.211  0.902  -0.824  1.823 
  SSA  25  0.275  1.582  -2.403  5.043 
  all  78  0.500  1.332  -2.648  5.043 
FBAS  ASIA  13  10.52  11.13  0  28.30 
  ECA  23  49.73  33.35  1.21  99.76 
  LAC  21  35.37  27.15  0  95.35 
  MENA  9  12.11  11.50  0  34.04 
  SSA  31  49.53  29.20  0  100 
  all  97  37.81  30.72  0  100 
SURGE flows  ASIA  13  5.472  6.183  -7.702  11.763 
  ECA  23  7.810  3.866  -6.105  11.806 
  LAC  21  5.200  5.822  -8.091  11.525 
  MENA  9  3.834  6.834  -8.483  9.263 
  SSA  31  3.389  4.607  -6.897  9.314 
  all  97  5.150  5.354  -8.483  11.806 
SURGE credit  ASIA  12  1.098  0.872  0.067  2.842 
  ECA  17  2.400  0.737  1.062  3.643 
  LAC  20  1.076  0.629  -0.169  2.664 
  MENA  8  0.714  0.430  -0.067  1.221 
  SSA  27  1.172  1.036  -0.047  4.065 
  all  84  1.344  0.975  -0.169  4.065 
FIN.OPENNESS  ASIA  13  -0.313  1.005  -1.129  1.27 
  ECA  22  0.712  1.541  -1.129  2.54 
  LAC  20  1.583  1.140  -0.764  2.54 
  MENA  9  0.492  1.722  -1.129  2.54 
  SSA  30  -0.548  1.362  -1.808  2.54 
  all  94  0.332  1.564  -1.808  2.54 
INST.QUALITY change  all  97  0.018  0.068  -0.332  0.159 
INST.QUALITY  all  97  -0.371  0.592  -1.687  1.153 
ExpP GDP GROWTH  all  94  -1.625  2.448  -7.698  4.197 
CHANGE MMR  all  52  -0.041  0.632  -0.785  3.164 
CA/GDP  all  96  -3.269  10.762  -25.185  40.655 
DEBT/GNI  all  90  41.313  31.417  3.522  166.815 
ERR  all  95  5.116  2.209  1  8 
RESERVES/DEBT  all  86  122.588  341.332  1.471  2435.307 
FLD  all  76  63.040  16.260  20.236  95.863 
CDR  all  92  0.935  0.424  0.257  2.390 Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis 
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FALLflows   1                                
                                 
FALLcredit  0.0807  1                              
  (0.4827)                               
FBAS  -0.2139  -0.0431  1                            
  (0.0354)  (0.7079)                             
SURGEflows  0.5794  0.0880  0.0627  1                          
  (0.0000)  (0.4436)  (0.5420)                           
SURGEcredit  0.1242  0.4873  0.1613  0.2551  1                        
  (0.2604)  (0.0000)  (0.1427)  (0.0192)                         
FIN.OPENNESS  0.2407  0.1466  0.2013  0.2404  0.0211  1                      
  (0.0195)  (0.2032)  (0.0517)  (0.0196)  (0.8499)                       
INST.QUALITY  0.3089  -0.0400  0.3136  0.3916  -0.0260  0.4258  1                    
  (0.0021)  (0.7283)  (0.0018)  (0.0001)  (0.8141)  (0.0000)                     
INST.QUALITY change  0.0234  0.0313  0.2066  0.1576  0.1946  0.0886  0.2300   1                  
  (0.8198)  (0.7856)  (0.0423)  (0.1232)  (0.0760)  (0.3956)  (0.0234)                   
ExpP GDP GROWTH  -0.2967  -0.1748  -0.1844  -0.2998  -0.1874  -0.2079  -0.4178   -0.3369  1                
  (0.0037)  (0.1310)  (0.0753)  (0.0033)  (0.0939)  (0.0480)  (0.0000)  (0.0009)                 
CHANGE MMR  0.0370  0.0888  0.0782  -0.0824  0.4065  -0.1486  -0.2292   -0.0319  -0.0742  1              
  (0.7946)  (0.5711)  (0.5817)  (0.5615)  (0.0046)  (0.2930)  (0.1022)  (0.8223)  (0.6088)               
CA/GDP  0.0402  0.0162  -0.3537  -0.2028  -0.1246  -0.1991  -0.2319   0.0708  0.1770  0.1003  1            
  (0.6974)  (0.8884)  (0.0004)  (0.0476)  (0.2588)  (0.0544)  (0.0230)  (0.4929)  (0.0896)  (0.4793)             
DEBT/GNI  0.0343  -0.1268  0.1039  0.1412  0.1251  0.1112  0.0310   -0.0584  -0.1358  -0.0463  -0.4936  1          
  (0.7482)  (0.2817)  (0.3298)  (0.1842)  (0.2689)  (0.3023)  (0.7715)  (0.5844)  (0.2070)  (0.7545)  (0.0000)           
ERR  0.1039  -0.0257  -0.0386  0.2065  0.0876  0.0867  0.1560   0.0664  -0.0947  -0.0820  -0.0010  -0.0555  1        
  (0.3164)  (0.8241)  (0.7101)  (0.0447)  (0.4310)  (0.4086)  (0.1312)  (0.5223)  (0.3694)  (0.5634)  (0.9926)  (0.6055)         
RESERVES/DEBT  -0.2536  0.0500  0.0072  -0.3117  -0.0586  0.0145  0.0946   0.0016  -0.0350  0.0215  0.4412  -0.2698  0.0119  1      
  (0.0184)  (0.6764)  (0.9479)  (0.0035)  (0.6100)  (0.8956)  (0.3862)  (0.9885)  (0.7518)  (0.8859)  (0.0000)  (0.0125)  (0.9137)       
FLD  -0.3165  0.1481  0.1282  -0.2773  -0.1853  -0.1203  -0.3328   -0.1297  0.2379  0.1996  -0.1944  0.0385  -0.1777  -0.0779   1    
  (0.0053)  (0.2428)  (0.2697)  (0.0153)  (0.1274)  (0.3004)  (0.0033)  (0.2641)  (0.0399)  (0.1785)  (0.0924)  (0.7466)  (0.1247)  (0.5213)     
CDR  0.2475  0.0652  0.1000  0.3079  0.2870  0.1900  0.3920   0.1203  -0.4615  0.0383  -0.2577  0.1690  -0.1367  -0.2042   -0.2567  1  
  (0.0174)  (0.5706)  (0.3427)  (0.0028)  (0.0081)  (0.0729)  (0.0001)  (0.2532)  (0.0000)  (0.7918)  (0.0131)  (0.1199)  (0.1962)  (0.0625)  (0.0273)   
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Appendix 6: FALL in bank flows - controlling for macroeconomic, structural and financial factors of influence 
Dependent variable: FALL in cross-border bank flows during the recent financial crisis 1/ 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
FBAS  -0.0240***  -0.0220***  -0.0239**  -0.0229**  -0.0247***  -0.0257***  -0.0262**  -0.0252***  -0.0229**  
  (0.0084)  (0.0079)  (0.0096)  (0.0091)  (0.0093)  (0.0085)   (0.0101)  (0.0094)  (0.0091)    
SURGE 2/  0.1306  0.1328  0.1307  0.1364  0.1241  0.1408     0.0825  0.1338  0.1307    
  (0.1031)  (0.1039)  (0.1071)  (0.1036)  (0.1066)  (0.1035)     (0.1450)  (0.1144)  (0.1141)    
SURGE^2  0.0608***  0.0621***  0.0609***  0.0598***  0.0619***  0.0610***  0.0667***  0.0651***  0.0624*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0114)  (0.0106)  (0.0120)  (0.0119)  (0.0110)     (0.0148)  (0.0106)  (0.0115)    
FIN.OPENNESS  0.4103**  0.4156**  0.4112**  0.4173**  0.4139**  0.4496***  0.4034**  0.5191**  0.4335**  
  (0.1663)  (0.1635)  (0.1790)  (0.1698)  (0.1741)  (0.1696)     (0.1781)  (0.2044)  (0.1717)    
ExpP GDP GROWTH  0.0124  -0.0357  0.0121  0.0061  0.0295  0.0269     0.0051  0.0332  0.0015    
  (0.0923)  (0.0931)  (0.0945)  (0.0975)  (0.1057)  (0.0910)     (0.1067)  (0.1221)  (0.1209)    
Structural and macroeconomic variables 
INST.QUALITY change    -6.7917**                              
    (2.8790)                              
INST.QUALITY      -0.0084                            
      (0.5841)                            
CA/GDP        0.0098                          
        (0.0210)                          
External and internal vulnerabilities 
DEBT/GNI          0.0039                        
          (0.0067)                        
ERR            -0.1206          
            (0.1230)          
RESERVES/DEBT              -0.0027**                    
              (0.0011)                    
FLD                0.0120                  
                (0.0232)                  
CDR                  -0.2409    
                  (0.5769)    
constant  1.4413***  1.3010**  1.4329*  1.4496***  1.3097**  2.0930***  1.6626**  0.4296  1.4775**  
  (0.5334)  (0.5456)  (0.8510)  (0.5404)  (0.6310)  (0.6188)     (0.6831)  (2.0068)  (0.6732)    
R-sqr  0.625  0.639  0.625  0.626  0.611  0.635     0.633  0.616  0.618    
N  91  91  91  91  86  90     82  75  87    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 1 percent level. 
Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors applied.  
1/ FALL is the logarithm of the difference between average pre-shock inflows in 2007Q3-2008Q2 and post-shock inflows in 2008Q4-2009Q1. 
2/ SURGE is the (log of the) aggregated capital inflows in the three years preceding the Lehman bankruptcy (2005Q3-2008Q2). 
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Appendix 7: FALL in credit growth – controlling for macroeconomic, structural and financial factors of influence 
Dependent variable: FALL in real credit growth during the recent financial crisis 1/ 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
FBAS  -0.0081  -0.0080  -0.0072  -0.0099  -0.0068  -0.0071  -0.0075     -0.0076  -0.0110*  -0.0087    
  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0088)  (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0056)     (0.0058)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)    
SURGEcredit  0.7280***  0.7479***  0.7188***  0.9221***  0.7328***  0.6889***  0.7248***  0.6922***  0.7119***  0.7941*** 
  (0.1742)  (0.1723)  (0.1721)  (0.2242)  (0.1715)  (0.1769)  (0.1753)     (0.1682)  (0.2271)  (0.1501)    
FIN.OPENNESS  0.1401  0.1399  0.1642*  -0.0351  0.1500  0.1353  0.1166     0.1412  0.1285  0.1573*   
  (0.0904)  (0.0898)  (0.0898)  (0.1430)  (0.0927)  (0.0920)  (0.0920)     (0.0954)  (0.0970)  (0.0903)    
ExpP GDP GROWTH  -0.0378  -0.0471  -0.0612  -0.0678  -0.0464  -0.0849  -0.0547     -0.0340  -0.0975  -0.0764    
  (0.0543)  (0.0553)  (0.0552)  (0.0839)  (0.0555)  (0.0686)  (0.0537)     (0.0660)  (0.0705)  (0.0600)    
Structural and macroeconomic variables 
INST.QUALITY change    -1.8070                                
    (3.3366)                                
INST.QUALITY      -0.2793                              
      (0.2109)                              
CHANGE MMR        -0.2910                            
        (0.2798)                            
CA/GDP          0.0126                          
          (0.0139)                          
External and internal vulnerabilities 
DEBT/GNI            -0.0086                        
            (0.0059)                        
ERR              -0.0388          
              (0.0545)          
RESERVES/DEBT                0.0017                    
                (0.0036)                    
FLD                  0.0267***                  
                  (0.0095)                  
CDR                    -0.5692    
                    (0.4130)    
constant  -0.2962  -0.3093  -0.4539*  -0.3444  -0.3200  0.0211  -0.1498     -0.3924  -1.8797***  0.1075    
  (0.2349)  (0.2464)  (0.2573)  (0.4134)  (0.2448)  (0.3452)  (0.3872)     (0.3719)  (0.6351)  (0.4029)    
R-sqr  0.293  0.298  0.302  0.379  0.301  0.322  0.301     0.289  0.343  0.317    
N  75  75  75  42  75  72  74     70  63  75    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 1 percent level. 
Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors applied. 
1/ FALL is the difference between the average m-o-m real credit growth in the pre-crisis period July 2007-June 2008 and the post-shock period October 2008-March 2009, seasonally adjusted rates. 
2/ SURGE is the average m-o-m real credit growth rate in the three years prior to the crisis (i.e. July 2005-June 2008), seasonally adjusted rates. 
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Appendix 8: Robustness checks – FALL measures 
Dependent variable: respective FALL measure covering different periods 
 
FALL from 2006Q3-2007Q2 
to 2008Q4-2009Q1 
FALL from 2007Q3-2008Q2 
to 2008Q4-2009Q2 
FALL from 2006Q3-2008Q2 
to 2008Q4-2009Q1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Flows  Credit  Flows  Credit  Flows  Credit 
FBAS  -0.0130  -0.0075  -0.0171**  -0.0035  -0.0150*  -0.0065    
  (0.0101)  (0.0050)  (0.0079)  (0.0047)  (0.0086)  (0.0046)    
SURGE 1/ 2/  0.0712  0.7454***  0.2021**  0.9103***  0.1602*  0.7163*** 
  (0.0914)  (0.1825)  (0.0959)  (0.1683)  (0.0914)  (0.1377)    
SURGE^2  0.0691***    0.0564***    0.0582***                  
  (0.0100)    (0.0099)    (0.0096)                  
constant  0.6342  0.0571  1.0832**  -0.3647  1.2399**  -0.0863    
  (0.6593)  (0.2938)  (0.4627)  (0.2248)  (0.5279)  (0.2365)    
R-sqr  0.464  0.276  0.591  0.416  0.587  0.330    
N  97  78  97  71  97  78    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 1 percent level. 
Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors applied. 
1/ SURGE for flows is the (log of the) aggregated capital inflows in the three years preceding the Lehman bankruptcy (2005Q3-2008Q2). 
2/ SURGE for credit is the average m-o-m real credit growth rate in the three years prior to the crisis (i.e. July 2005-June 2008), seasonally ad-
justed rates. 
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Appendix 9: Robustness checks – SURGE measures 
Dependent variable: respective FALL measure 
  Variation of SURGE period  Variation of SURGE calculation method 
  Flows 1/  Credit 2/  Flows 1/  Credit 2/ 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 








FBAS  -0.0222***  -0.0189**  -0.0179**  -0.0051  -0.0068  -0.0067     -0.0195*  -0.0237*  -0.0047  -0.0045    
  (0.0069)  (0.0083)  (0.0084)  (0.0049)  (0.0053)  (0.0052)     (0.0116)  (0.0120)  (0.0048)  (0.0045)    
SURGE  0.2572**  0.1285  0.0865  0.7447***  0.6322***  0.5973***                        
  (0.1062)  (0.0826)  (0.0689)  (0.1426)  (0.1737)  (0.1765)                           
SURGE^2  0.0563***  0.0615***  0.0655***                                             
  (0.0115)  (0.0091)  (0.0084)                                             
SURGEalt                             -0.0369  -0.0002  1.0694***  1.4644*** 
                             (0.0576)  (0.0580)  (0.3206)  (0.3035)    
SURGEalt^2                             0.0000***  0.0000**                    
                             (0.0000)  (0.0000)                    
constant  1.2703***  1.2672***  1.2437**  -0.3390  -0.0197  0.0415     5.0533***  5.3570***  0.4896*  0.3553    
  (0.4295)  (0.4727)  (0.5229)  (0.2157)  (0.2300)  (0.2285)     (0.5823)  (0.5844)  (0.2476)  (0.2348)    
R-sqr  0.651  0.567  0.575  0.331  0.221  0.202     0.154  0.114  0.140  0.250    
N  95  96  96  78  75  75     96  96  75  75    
Stars indicate statistical significance at * 10 percent, **5 percent and *** 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses below. Robust standard errors applied. 
1/ FALL for flows is the logarithm of the difference between average pre-shock inflows in 2007Q3-2008Q2 and average post-shock inflows in 2008Q4-2009Q1. 
2/ FALL for credit is the difference between the average m-o-m real credit growth in the pre-crisis period July 2007-June 2008 and the post-shock period October 2008-March 2009, seasonally adjusted rates. 
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Appendix 10: List of variables 
Name  Description  Source 
FALLflows  difference between the average cross-border bank flows in 2007Q3 
- 2008Q2 and the average bank flows in 2008Q4 - 2009Q1 (logs)  
SURGEflows  aggregated cross-border bank flows over the three years prior to 
the Lehman bankruptcy (i.e. 2005Q3-2008Q2) (logs)  
BIS International locational 
banking statistics, Table 6A 
FALLcredit 
difference between average monthly real credit growth in Sep. 2007 
- Aug. 2008 and the average real credit growth in Oct. 2008 - Mar. 
2009, seasonally adjusted rates 
SURGEcredit  average month-on-month real credit growth in the three years prior 
to the crisis (July 2005-June2008), seasonally adjusted rates 
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